股权结构与公司绩效研究 毕业设计(论文)外文参考资料及译文.doc

股权结构与公司绩效研究Ownership structure and corporate performanceAbstractThis paper investigates the relation between the ownership structure and the performance of corporations if ownership is made multi-dimensional and also is treated as an endogenous variable. To our knowledge, no prior study has treated the corporate control problem this way. We find no statistically significant relation between ownership structure and firm performance. This finding is consistent with the view that diffuse ownership, while it may exacerbate some agency problems, also yields compensating advantages that generally offset such problems. Consequently, for data that reflect market-mediated ownership structures, no systematic relation between ownership structure and firm performance is to be expected. q2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.JEL classification: G32; G34Keywords: Ownership structure; Corporate performance; Endogenous variableIntroductionThe connection between ownership structure and performance has been the subject of an important and ongoing debate in the corporate finance literature. The debate goes back to the Berle and Means 1932. thesis, which suggests that an inverse correlation should be observed between the diffuseness of shareholdings and firm performance. Their view has been challenged by Demsetz 1983., who argues that the ownership structure of a corporation should be thought of as an endogenous outcome of decisions that reflect the influence of shareholders and of trading on the market for shares. When owners of a privately held company decide to sell shares, and when shareholders of a publicly held corporation agree to a new secondary distribution, they are, in effect, deciding to alter the ownership structure of their firms and, with high probability, to make that structure more diffuse.Subsequent trading of shares will reflect the desire of potential and existing owners to change their ownership stakes in the firm. In the case of a corporate takeover, those who would be owners have a direct and dominating influence on the firms ownership structure. In these ways, a firms ownership structure reflects decisions made by those who own or who would own shares. The ownership structure that emerges, whether concentrated or diffuse, ought to be influenced by the profit-maximizing interests of shareholders, so that, as a result, there should be no systematic relation between variations in ownership structure and variations in firm performance.The empirical studies about the relation between both variables seem to have yielded conflicting results. Demsetz and Lehn 1985. provide evidence of the endogeneity of a firms ownership structure argued for by Demsetz 1983. and also assess the validity of the Berle and Means thesis: A linear regression of anaccounting measure of profit rate on the fraction of shares owned by the five largest shareholding interests and on a set of control variables., in which ownership structure is treated as an endogenous variable, gives no evidence of a relation between profit rate and ownership concentration. Morck et al. 1988. ignore the endogeneity issue altogether and re-examine the relation between corporate ownership structure and performance. Like Demsetz and Lehn 1985., they find no significant relation in the linear regressions they estimate using Tobins Q and accounting profit rate as alternative measures of performance. However, they also estimate a piecewise linear regression of Tobins Q on insider ownership, and this does provide evidence of a non-monotonic relation. The estimated piecewise regression is positive for management holdings of shares between 0% and 5% of outstanding shares, negative for management holdings between 5% and 25%, and positive once more for management holdings greater than 25%.11 The starting and stopping values of management holdings that define these pieces are not derived from theory but, rather, according to whether they mark changes in the pattern of the data. The plausibility of the different directions taken by the slopes of the adjacent segments in this piecewise regression might be rationalized as a reflection of the changing interests of professional management as its ownership interest moves from insignificant to significant, but the zigzag nature of the segment slopes is not suggestive of the uniformly concave downward or upward relation that might reasonably be expect from this rationalization. Moreover, Morck et al. 1988. also find that the results from this piecewise regression are not robust to a substitution of accounting profit rate for Tobins Q.H. Demsetz, B. VillalongarJournal of Corporate Finance 7 (2001) 209233 211 Other articles have followed the Morck et al. 1988. study. Included among these are McConnell and Servaes 1990., Hermalin and Weisbach 1988., Loderer and Martin 1997., Cho 1998., Himmelberg et al. 1999., and Holderness et al.1999. Summary descriptions of these studies are provided in Appendix A. All rely chiefly on Tobins Q as a measure of firm performance, although a few also examine accounting profit rate, and all emphasize managerial shareholdings as a measure of ownership structure. Differences abound across these studies, in measurements and sample used, in estimating technique applied, in whether and how they account for the endogeneity of ownership structure, and in results obtained. Fig. 1 shows the results of all the studies of firm performance and ownership structure that followed Demsetz and Lehn 1985.2 We do not judge here which of these articles offers. the most reliable guide. However, Fig. 1 suggests that these studies, viewed in totality, do not give strong evidence by which to reject the belief that firm performance and managerial equity ownership are unrelated.In Section 2, we analyze the conceptual issues surrounding each of the threemain aspects that seem to explain the differences in results observed acrossstudies: The measurements of firm performance, the measure of ownership structure used, and whether or not the endogeneity of ownership structure is taken into account in the estimation of the effect of ownership on performance. Our analysis suggests that none of the studies we examine treat ownership structure appropriately. It should be modeled not only as an endogenous variable but also, simultaneously, as an amalgam of shareholdings owned by persons with differentinterests. In particular, the fractions of shares owned by outside shareholders and by management should be measured separately. To our knowledge, no study to date incorporates both these aspects of ownership structure.3 Hence, a restudy of the ownershipperformance relation seems needed. Our restudy fills this gap. It models ownership structure as an endogenous variable and it examines two dimensions of this structure likely to represent conflicting interests, the fraction of shares owned by management and the fraction of shares owned by the five largest shareholding interests. For the 223 firm sample examined here, the evidence supports the belief that ownership structure is endogenous but not the belief that ownership structure affects firm performance. The Demsetz and Lehn results are not shown in Fig. 1 because they are based on different measures of profit and ownership structure than are the results portrayed in Fig. The studies that take the endogeneity of ownership into account to some degree include Demsetz and Lehn 1985., Hermalin and Weisbach 1991., Loderer and Martin 1997., Cho 1998., and Himmelberg et al. 1999. Holderness et al. 1999. confirm the endogeneity of insider ownership but do not account for it in their estimation of the ownershipperformance relation. None of these studies consider more than one measure of ownership structure. McConnell and Servaes 1990. consider both insider ownership and block holder ownership; however, they do not treat ownership structure as endogenous.All the measures of ownership structure used by Demsetz and Lehn are based on the fraction of shares owned by a firms most significant shareholders, with most attention being given by them to the fraction owned by the five largest shareholders.4 The studies that came after the Demsetz and Lehn article focus on the fraction of shares owned by a firms management. Management holdings include shares owned by members of the corporate board, the CEO, and top management. Exclusive reliance on this measure to track the severity of the agency problems suggests that all shareholders classified as management have a common interest. This is not likely to be true. A board member, for example, may have a position on the board because he has, or represents someone who has, large holdings of the companys stock. Board members like this do not have interests identical to those of professional management. More likely, their interests are more closely aligned with those of outside investors. Insider board members that really are, or that really represent, outside investor interests may not be rare. For the sample of firms in our study, the correlation between the fraction of shares owned by important shareholding families and the fraction owned by management is 0.67. This positive correlation suggests that important shareholding families do have representation on corporate boards. These family board members, or their representatives, cannot be thought of as having interests in common with those of ApureB management personnel. A high level of management shareholdings, therefore, is not so reliable an index of the strength of professional managements representation in the firms operations as most studies using this measure assume it to be.ConclusionThe results from our study and from some of the studies preceding it yield unequivocal evidence for the endogeneity of ownership structure. It follows from this that the coefficients of single equation models of the effect of ownership structure on performance are biased. Bias is also likely to result from studies that fail to take account of the complexity of interests that are involved in an ownership structure. Our study examines the roles played by two aspects of ownership structure, the fraction of shares owned by the five largest shareholding interests and the fraction of shares owned by management, and it models these but primarily does so for management shareholdings. as endogenous. An adequate study of the corporate control problem may call for more than is provided here, but the estimates of the two equation model we use give no evidence to support the notion that variations across firms in observed ownership structures result in systematic variations in observed firm performances.This is consistent with the notion that ownership structures most suit the conditions under which firms operate are those that we tend to observe. The market for corporate control involves much more than hostile takeovers or management buyouts. It also involves the acquisition and sale of shares in ordinary exchange transactions. In all these facets, the market responds to forces that create suitable ownership structures for firms, and this removes any predictable relation between empirically observed ownership structures and firm rates of return.The contrary belief that there should be a predicable relation, arises with surprising frequency. It certainly is an important part of the Berle and Means thesis and it is reflected in the way contemporary authors explain evidence of it in their studies. For reasons already discussed, this evidence is biased, but the explanation given for it rests on a confusion. The pedagogically useful classroom discussion of the relation between ownership structure and the resolution of agency problems, which ignores endogenous adjustment of ownership structure, is confused with the Amarket mediatedB observed relation between ownership strucH. ture and firm performance. Our findings support the view that the market succeeds in bringing forth ownership structures, whether these be diffuse or concentrated,that are of approximate appropriateness for the firms they serve. These structures differ across firms because of differences in the circumstances facing firms, particularly in regard to scale economies, regulation, and the stability of the environment in which they operate. If these structures were the outcomes of perfect markets for control, they would eliminate any systematic relation between firm performance and ownership structure. While we make no claim that the market in which ownership structures are formed is perfect, our evidence shows that it is not so imperfect as to create a systematic relation.所有制结构和企业业绩摘 要本文考察了公司所有制结构和性能之间的关系。如果所有权是多维的，也被视为内生变量。据我们所知，没有事先研究处理企业的控制这个问题的方式。我们没有发现所有制结构之间的关系到统计学意义上的公司业绩。这一调查结果被一致认为弥漫所有权，而它可能会加剧一些代理问题，也得到补偿的优势，一般在偏移等问题。因此，数据反映市场主导的所有权结构，所有制结构和企业绩效之间没有系统的关系是预计2001年Elsevier科学BV保留的所有权利。关键词：所有制结构，企业绩效的内生变量介绍 所有制结构和性能之间的连接一直是企业融资文学的重要的和正在进行的辩论的主题。辩论的伯利追溯到1932年。这表明，一个呈负相关，应遵守持股散漫的公司业绩。他们的观点受到了挑战，德姆塞茨（1983），是一个通讯作者。德姆塞茨认为，一个企业的所有制结构应被看作一个内源性的成果，反映了股东和影响力的决定对市场交易的股份。当一家私人控股公司的业主决定出售股份，当一家公开上市公司的股东同意到一个新的领域，那么他们是二次分配的作用。他们决定改变公司所有制结构和公司绩效，使该结构更加分散。随后交易的股份将反映业主潜在的和现有的愿望，改变其在公司的所有权。在一个企业被收购的情况下，这些人将想出一个直接的或主导的影响该公司的所有制结构的决策。在这些方面，一个企业的所有制结构都将影响股东做出那些拥有或将自己的股票出让的决定。所有权结构出现，无论是集中或弥漫性的，应该会受股东利润最大化的影响，因此，应该是考虑在所有制结构的变化和变化之间没有系统关系的公司业绩。 德姆塞茨和莱恩（1983）发现关于这两个变量之间的关系的实证研究，两者似乎是产生矛盾的结果。提供关于一个企业的所有制结构的内生性的证据，主张人也是德姆塞茨（1983），评估伯利的有效性和手段。线性回归由五个拥有部分股份的盈利率的会计措施组成，赞德占一组控制变量最大的股权，所有制结构作为内生变量的处理，却没有给出一个证据证明利润率和股权集中度的关系。摩洛克等人也完全忽视了内生性问题和重新审视之间的关系，企业所有制结构和性能。德姆塞茨和莱恩（1985）得到的结果的一样，他们发现两者与采用线性回归没有显着关系。他们用托宾Q和会计收益率作为替代措施的表现。然而，他们也估计托宾Q分段线性回归内幕所有权，这提供的证据并非单调关系。估计分段回归是积极管理持有介于0和5的流通股，为管理层持股的负面占了5和25，并积极管理集团更大的股份超过25。用管理集团的启动和停止值定义这些作品并非衍生从理论，而不是根据它们是否标志着在数据模式的变化。合理性的相邻节段的斜坡在此分段采取不同的方向回归可能会作为一个专业管理不断变化的利益，反映合理化其所有权从微不足道的兴趣转移到显著，但该段曲折性质的斜坡是不是均匀的向下或向上的关系，可能会合理地显示出这个合理化的期望。此外，还发现，从这个结果可以看出分段回归没有替代占利润率强大的托宾Q。德姆塞茨和比利亚隆对企业融资其他物品都进行研究。这些都是麦康奈尔和魏兹巴赫等人研究出来的。这些研究的摘要说明在附录A中的所有主要依靠对托宾Q作为衡量公司业绩，虽然有少数也检查会计收益率，都强调作为一种管理持股所有制结构的措施。在这些研究中，测量和样品，在估计技术的应用，如何在他们的内生性占多大的所有制结构，以及取得成果之间都是差异。对公司业绩和所有制结构研究之后，德姆塞茨和莱恩（1985）说，我们无法判断这这些文章是不是最可靠的指导。然而总体来看，这些研究不给拒绝的信念，公司业绩和强有力的证据与管理股权无关。 我们分析了周围三个概念性问题的主要方面，似乎在观察整个结果的差异。研究企业绩效，所有权的措施使用结构，和所有制结构的内生性，考虑所有权对性能的影响估计。我们的分析表明，我们研究治疗所有制结构适当。它不仅是一个内生变量，但也应仿照，同时，作为汞合金持股人拥有不同利益。尤其是由外部股东拥有的股份的比例和管理部门应单独计量。据我们所知，还没有研究结合这两方面的所有制结构。因此，似乎需要有一个再认识拥有性能的关系。我们的再认识，填补这一空白。它作为一种内源性的所有制结构模型变量和它检查两个可能代表这种结构尺寸利益冲突（由管理层拥有的股份和分数五大股权拥有的股份）。对于223公司样本，这里审查证据支持的信念，所有制结构的内源性，但不认为所有制结构影响公司业绩。德姆塞茨和莱恩的结果不会显示出来。因为它们是基于不同利润和所有制结构比来进行研究的。研究考虑到内生性的所有权，在一定程度上包括德姆塞茨，莱恩（1985），魏兹巴赫（1991），马丁（1997），赵（1998）和内等人确认内部人持股的内生性，但不占它在其性能的所有权关系的估计。这些研究没有考虑多个所有制结构的措施，同时考虑麦康奈尔有内幕所有权和块持有人的所有权。然而，他们不把所有制结构作为内源性。这些措施所使用的所有制结构使法姆塞茨对部分股份公司的重要股东非常重视，给了他们一部分股份，使他们成为五个最大的分数股东。研究后不久,将重点讲解法姆塞茨著部分股份公司的管理。管理集团包括股份公司董事会成员、CEO等顶部管理人员。仅依赖于这项措施表明所有股东代理都有共同的利益这个问题。我觉得这不可能是真的。一位董事会成员,例如,黑板上有一个位置,因为他有,或代表有人拥有大控股公司的股票。董事会成员喜欢这个没有兴趣同专业的管理