减少美国金融系统的系统性风险【外文翻译】 .doc
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1、原文:The Reduction of Systematic Risk In The United States Financial SystemGoing forward, the central problem for financial regulation (defined as the prescription of rules, as distinct from supervision or risk assessment) is to reduce systemic risk. Systemic risk is the risk that the failure of one s
2、ignificant financial institution can cause or significantly contribute to the failure of other significant financial institutions as a result of their linkages to each other. Systemic risk can also be defined to include the possibility that one exogenous shock may simultaneously cause or contribute
3、to the failure of multiple significant financial institutions. This Article focuses on the former definition because proper regulation could have the greatest potential to reduce systemic risk in this area.There are four principal linkages that can result in a chain reaction of failures. First, ther
4、e are interbank deposits, whether from loans or from correspondent accounts used to process payments. These accounts were the major concern when Continental Illinois Bank almost failed in the mid-1980s. Continental held sizable deposits of other banks; in many cases, the amount of the deposits subst
5、antially exceeded the capital of the depositor banks. These banks generally held such sizable deposits because they cleared payments, such as checks or wire transfers, through Continental. If Continental had failed, those banks would have failed as well. Section 308 of the FDIC Improvement Act of 19
6、91 gives the Federal Reserve Board powers to deal with this problem. The Act permits the Board to limit the credit extended by an insured depository institution to another depository institution. Limitation of interbank deposits may be feasible with respect to placements by one bank with another bec
7、ause the amount of credit extended is fixed for a given term. Indeed, it appears that the chain-reaction risk arising from bilateral credit exposures from overnight Federal Reserve funds transactions is quite low: Losses would not exceed one percent of total commercial banking assets as long as loss
8、 rates are kept to historically observed levels.Exposures are more difficult to identify with respect to interbank clearing accounts where the amount of credit extended is a function of payment traffic. For example, Bank A may be credited by its correspondent Bank B for an incoming wire transfer of
9、$10 million. Bank A is thus a creditor of Bank B for this amount. If Bank B were to fail Bank A is seriously exposed. Without material changes in the payment system, such as forcing banks to make and receive all payments through Federal Reserve rather than correspondent accounts, it would be quite d
10、ifficult to limit these types of exposures.Second, a chain reaction of bank failures can occur through net settlement payment systems. If one bank fails to settle its position in a net settlement system for large value payments, such as the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) in the Uni
11、ted States, other banks that do not get paid may, in turn, fail. This risk was the major systemic risk concern of the Federal Reserve until CHIPS changed its settlement procedures in 2001 to essentially eliminate this risk.Third, a chain reaction of bank failures can occur through imitative runs. Wh
12、en one bank fails, depositors in other banks, particularly those whose deposits are uninsured, may assume that their banks may also fail and so withdraw their funds, exposing these banks to a liquidity crisis and ultimately to failure. This result comes from a lack of information in the market about
13、 what specifically caused the first bank to fail.(n15) The Federal Reserve plays the classic role of lender of last resort to stem irrational imitative runs in situations such as this one.Lastly, and especially prominent in the current crisis, a chain reaction of bank failures can occur as a result
14、of counterparty risk on derivative transactions, such as credit default swaps (CDSs). ).Here the concern is that if institution X fails to settle its derivative position with institution Y, both X and Y will fail. If Y in turn cannot settle its positions, other institutions will also fail. This risk
15、 proved potentially significant in the failure of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998. Concerns of this type also underlay JPMorgan Chases assisted acquisition of Bear Stearns and the injection of federal funds into AIG.(n18) This is one area in which the failure of non-banks is a ma
16、jor concern, but the severity of this form of systemic risk and the degree of interconnectedness among financial institutions is currently unknown.(n19) A report by the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) on the governments investments in AIG indicated that Gold
17、man Sachs, a major counterparty, would have been made whole in the event of an AIG default. The report further indicated that the Treasury and Federal Reserve were primarily concerned with losses that would be incurred by investors in AIG in the event of a default, including $10 billion of state and
18、 local government money, $40 billion in 401(k) plans, and $38 billion in retirement plans. The reports explanation of the governments action also mentioned concern over stemming runs on money market funds, which held $20 billion in AIG commercial paper. Similarly, in their recent testimony on the Fe
19、deral Bailout of AIG, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and New York Federal Reserve General Counsel Thomas Baxter also emphasized factors other than derivatives counterparty risk, including the impact that the failure of AIG would have on money market funds, personal savings and retirement plans,
20、 and insurance policyholders. If prospective investor losses, rather than the fallout of interconnectedness, were the true basis for the government policy with respect to AIG, it may be that the concern with systemic risk is overstated. Further study and better disclosure from the Treasury and Feder
21、al Reserve is needed to support informed estimates of the magnitude of the problem. In any event, gauging the impact of systemic risk is difficult to determine and beyond the scope of this Article.The threat of systemic risk (whether real or imagined) results in both the need for government bailouts
22、 at taxpayer expense and in an increase in moral hazard. These results occur because both equity and debt holders, as well as counterparties, may be protected against losses. Of course, the government could decide not to intervene, but this laissez-faire approach could put the entire global economy
23、at risk, an even worse outcome. As the financial crisis has illustrated, banks cannot always count on the government to cut off systemic risk when it occurs. The politics of supplying money to banks are unpopular and unsustainable by the Federal Reserve over the long term without intense public scru
24、tiny and loss of independence.At the outset, it is also worth noting that the Volcker Rules and related limitations on bank size announced by the Obama Administration on January 21, 2009 do not have much if any potential to reduce systemic risk. The Volcker Rules would prohibit bank holding companie
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