LSR全球资产配置:_美国短暂衰退将至_日本QE加大中国通缩、货币战风险-2013-04-15.pdf
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1、 April 2013 Macroeconomic Outlook Fiscally induced US recession danger postponed, not averted A spending surge and saving collapse may have raised Q1 GDP growth to 3%, but reversal in Q2 Japan takes big risk for small reward: no more yen for yen? Japan could get 4% broad money growth and 2% real GDP
2、 growth from its new policies, but risks storing up huge financial risks without generating 2% Liquidity and Central Banks An alternative monetary interpretation of Kurodas plan The BoJs aggressive monetary stimulus cannot on its own stem Japans relative economic decline. But it has the potential to
3、 end debt of Japans malaise. This article offers an alternative view of the economic and asset market consequences of Mr. Kurodas plan. Investment Outlook Equities European Banks bore the brunt of market reaction to Cyprus and stay vulnerable as tensions simmer across the Eurozone. Italy and Spain =
4、 still pariah markets. Weak US Q1 earnings expectations may be enough to support the S 2nd Article, Charles Dumas Investment Outlook Eugenio Montersino. LSR Asset Allocation Macroeconomic Outlook ly induced US recession danger postponed, not averted Japan takes big risk for small reward no more yen
5、for yen? Liquidity and central banks An alternative monetary interpretation of Kurodas plan Asset Allocation is based on the analysis and insights of all LSR economists and strategists. Individual sections have been prepared as follows: Macroeconomic Outlook Article, Charles Dumas; Liquidity and Cen
6、tral Banks Equities, Melissa Kidd; Fixed Income, Andrea Cicione; 3 4 4 7 11 11 14 14 20 24 Asset Allocation is based on the analysis and insights of all LSR economists and strategists. ared as follows: Macroeconomic Outlook 1st Article, ; Liquidity and Central Banks Jamie Dannhauser; Equities, Melis
7、sa Kidd; Fixed Income, Andrea Cicione; Model Portfolio Asset Allocation 3 Asset allocation matrix (12-month view) Bold indicates change of view (old rating in brackets) April 2013 Equities Bonds FX vs $ Monetary Policy North America US 0 0 carry on buying Canada -1 0 -1 unchanged Developed Europe UK
8、 0 0 -1 QE Switzerland 0 -1 FX target is QE Euro Area -1 -1 interest rates down Germany -1 0 France -1 0 Italy -2 0 Spain -2 -1 Asia Japan 0 0 0 large QE Australia 0 -1 interest rates down China -1 0 neutral overall India 0 +1 (0) interest rates down Korea -1 -1 (0) interest rates down Taiwan -1 -1
9、(0) easier Latin America Brazil -1 0 +1 (0) interest rates up Mexico 0 +1 +1 interest rates down Emerging Europe % of the increase is assumed in Q2 (affecting real consumer spending growth negatively at 2% annualised) and % in each of Q3 and Q4 (a 1% annualised negative effect in each quarter). For
10、Q1, the assembly of these factors leads to a growth forecast of 3% (annualised). Real consumer spending could be up at a 2-3% rate, contributing nearly 2% to real GDP growth. Household net worth and savings rate, % disposable income -2.5% 0.0% 2.5% 5.0% 7.5% 10.0% 12.5%375% 425% 475% 525% 575% 625%
11、675% 1963 Q1 1968 Q1 1973 Q1 1978 Q1 1983 Q1 1988 Q1 1993 Q1 1998 Q1 2003 Q1 2008 Q1 Jan- Feb av. Net worth, left (inverted) scale Savings rate, right scale 6 LSR Asset Allocation The post-Sandy reconstruction, together with housing strength, should slightly outweigh the cuts in government spending
12、arising from both the 2011 debt ceiling agreement, and sequestration that started on March 1st. Real growth in business cap-ex and the inventory contribution could add more than 1% to GDP growth, but net exports are likely to be negative, as import growth should significantly outweigh exports. Q2 an
13、d Q3 are likely to see “payback”. Q2 GDP could fall at % annualised. Real disposable incomes may rise a little, but not much. Employment, on the household measure that better captures recent tendencies, is virtually flat. Real wages and salaries are only gaining minimally. High incomes are “giving b
14、ack” the pay-out at the end of 2012. Real disposable income growth could be less than 1% in Q2 (annualised), and real consumer spending would therefore fall at a 1% rate, given the assumed 2% negative effect of higher saving with a % negative contribution to GDP growth. Real government spending, wit
15、h the Sandy effect tailing off, ie, negative in addition to budget cuts and the mounting impact of sequestration, could contribute another 1% negatively. Manufacturing data suggest weaker growth of cap-ex and inventories, but continued strong housing could mean private capital spending contributes a
16、 positive 1% to growth. The rest of the world is in the doldrums, so export weakness may offset much of the import decline likely in this scenario. In Q3, real GDP could fall again, this time closer to a 1% annualised rate, a key assumption being that sequestration lasts through the fiscal year to S
17、eptember. Real disposable income growth at a 1% annualised rate is likely to be offset by the higher savings rate forecast, leaving consumer spending flat. Real government spending cuts could again contribute as much as minus 1% to GDP, with sequestration reaching full pitch. Cuts in real business c
18、ap-ex and inventories are likely to offset housing strength. Net exports again could be close to neutral. In Q4, GDP could be positive, but slow. Again, there is little to hope for from consumer spending, with employment probably weak and the savings rate continuing to revert. Much will depend on th
19、e result of budget negotiations. But from Q4 onward we expect the combined forces of housing recovery, replacement demand for cars, energy investment, production and lowering of costs to the consumer, and US cost competitiveness as an investment location, to initiate a strong recovery. These forecas
20、ts continue to suggest a serious downswing in corporate profits, unless the savings rate reversion does not occur as assumed, in which case both GDP and corporate profits should hold up better in Q2-Q4. Charles Dumas Macroeconomic Outlook 7 Japan takes big risk for small reward no more yen for yen?
21、Japans move from economic repression to violent stimulus caught the world by surprise again last week. It has the look of desperation about it. Before the new Bank of Japan Governor Kuroda dropped his QE bombshell on April 4th we had analysed how the changes known as “Abenomics” had at that stage la
22、rgely ignored Japans chief structural problem, and skirted about it with palliatives. (See our March Quarterly Review and the subsequent Monthly Review, “Abenomics another Japanese sink-hole”.) The QE announcement, likewise, is directed at the symptom of Japans problems deflation rather than their c
23、ause: some 12- 14% of GDP too much net cash flow in business and too little in households. What Kurodas QE has achieved is the high likelihood that growth this year and next will be 2%, enough to check deflation, but probably not to reach the inflation target of 2%. The size of the QE relative to GD
24、P, 10% in each of 2013 and 2014, is more than half as much again as Mr Bernankes in the US, though the inordinate size of Japanese broad money, well over twice GDP, means it is only about 4% of M3. M3 growth this year and next could be only some 4%, certainly not earth-shattering. The benefit of thi
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